World War II in Yugoslavia: A Historiographical Review

17 08 2009

In his The Balkans Since 1453, L.S. Stavrianos outlines a typology of resistance movements for Balkan countries under Axis occupation during World War II. In general, argues Stavrianos, resistance movements within countries differed primarily on an economic basis.[1] While the haves, usually royalists, aspired to restore the pre-war status quo once the occupiers were defeated, the have-nots, who would eventually adopt communist programs, envisioned a new society after the war.[2] Their immediate strategies against the occupiers also differed. The haves had much to lose and thus opted for restraint against the occupier until an armed uprising could be coordinated with an Allied invasion.[3] Subscribing to the theory that guerilla resistances grow by fighting or die out with inactivity, Stavrianos claims that it was the more active have-nots who gained the upper hand.[4] The emergence of a communist program for a social revolution after the war among the have-nots ultimately led many “honest patriots” in royalist ranks to choose collaboration with the Axis as the lesser of two evils.[5]

As a general model, Stavrianos’ typology is applicable to several aspects of World War II Yugoslavia. Yet, a more detailed investigation into Yugoslavia during the war will reveal that a modular approach to Axis-occupied Yugoslavia cannot encapsulate everything that occurred. Yugoslavia’s complex ethnic composition, the varying territorial and political aspirations of the occupying forces and the regularity of atrocities against civilian populations throughout the conflict are only some of the factors that prevent armed groups under occupation in World War II Yugoslavia from being understood through Stavrianos’ single model; a model which may be more applicable to Yugoslavia’s more ethnically homogenous neighboring states.

Challenges of Yugoslav historiography

Before pursuing a study of Yugoslavia during World War II, one must identify several factors that have influenced historiography dealing with the period. As the triumphant Partizans under the leadership of Josip Broz – Tito took over Yugoslavia, a major obstacle they needed to surpass were the tensions that existed between Yugoslavia’s ethnic nationalities; tensions that were seriously aggravated by the numerous atrocities that occurred between these groups throughout the Second World War. The failure to sufficiently discuss how Titoist historiography and policies distorted the manner in which World War II was, and still is, studied is a major setback for several works dealing with the period. While Richard West’s analysis of the issue in his biography of Tito is brief, it somewhat clarifies the problem of the official narrative about occupation and resistance that prevailed during Tito’s reign.

Tito refused to admit that a nationalities problem existed in Yugoslavia when he launched the campaign for “Brotherhood and Unity” among all of Yugoslavia’s nationalities.[6] Rather than acknowledging that Serbs, Croats and Muslims had committed large-scale atrocities against each other, often without any prompting by the occupying powers, Tito’s regime required that “the Serb and Croat nationalists were depicted as Nazi quislings, bourgeois reactionaries or agents of Anglo-American imperialism. Even the names Četnik and Ustaša rarely appeared in the press and those they had killed were vaguely described as ‘victims of fascism’.”[7]

The utilization of phrases such as “domestic fascists”, which Milovan Đilas uses throughout his Wartime, and “victims of fascism” was an attempt to diffuse guilt for wartime atrocities evenly among Yugoslavia’s ethnic groups.[8] Despite the rigor with which the official narrative was enforced, it is difficult to believe that the majority of the populace accepted such a simplification of the war. While many may have been aware of the brutal atrocities that Četnik groups carried out against innocent Muslim and Croat villages, attempts to equalize Četnik crimes, in the name of Brotherhood and Unity, to the systematic program the Ustaše developed to eliminate Croatia’s Serbs were bound to fail. The refusal to acknowledge such a narrative by a good portion of the public, especially by many Serbs who were sympathetic towards the Četnik cause, resulted in the perpetuation of a different, more realistic, stereotype of the Četniks.

An abundance of stereotypical portrayals of the Četniks can be found in Đilas’ autobiography. Even though the official Titoist narrative would object to Đilas’ belief that the Četniks never fully supported the Axis, the overall portrayal fits within the Titoist model.[9] The Četniks were depicted as cowardly and skeptical of fighting. Instead of confronting the Axis troops, Četniks chose to stay in the woods and enjoy the food they had looted from surrounding villages. In the unlikely case that they did fight, they would commit atrocities against civilian populations, Serb and non-Serb alike. Instead of organizing further military actions upon capturing territory from the enemy, they would get drunk and rape the local women.[10]

The negative image of the Četnik was constructed against a positive image of the Partizan. The polar opposite of the Četnik, the Partizan was willing to sacrifice his or her life in attacking the occupation forces regardless of the repercussions. Women had an equal role in the Partizan account of the war.  The Partizan was also courteous to civilians and fully committed to the further advancement of the resistance movement. Such a dichotomized view was reinforced through publically displayed convictions of Četniks for treason and war crimes, school textbooks, historical volumes, and a number of popular action films about World War II, some of which featured global superstars such as Richard Burton, who played Tito in The Battle of Sutjeska.[11] In several aspects, the Titoist portrayal was not always too far from the truth. Yet, the self-gratifying images of the Partizan constructed at the expense of the Četnik impeded an objective study of the Yugoslavia during World War II.

Matteo J. Milazzo’s The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance, for the most part, uses German and Italian military sources. However, many of Milazzo’s conclusions about the collaborationist nature of the Četniks are based on documents from the Partizans and communist archives in post-war Yugoslavia. Milazzo’s description of the Četnik and Partizan political and ideological goals is based primarily on communist sources.[12] He cites extensively from Jovan Marjanović’s Ustanak i Naroodnoslobodilacki Pokert, a volume published in Titoist Yugoslavia. While some of his conclusions are affirmed by more credible non-Partizan military sources, many are not. Even though some of Milazzo’s conclusions about the Četniks are accurate, volumes by authors that choose to use Titoist sources would benefit greatly from a section discussing the problematic influence of the Titoist narrative on the study of the Second World War. Milazzo completely ignores the issue, which can be excused to a degree given that he is writing in 1975, even though Titoist censorship should have been evident even then. However, even the 2001 edition of Jozo Tomasevich’s 800-page long War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, almost entirely ignores the influence of the pro-Partizan official narrative on how World War II in Yugoslavia was viewed. The rather short section dealing with how several groups in Yugoslavia attempted to gain political capital by manipulating the numbers of victims that perished during the war does not do justice to the issue.[13]

The communist narrative is not the only influence that continues to distort the understanding of Yugoslavia’s World War II history. With Tito’s death in 1980, nationalism experienced a revival in Yugoslavia. Nationalist intellectuals, who were silenced during Tito’s lifetime, grasped the opportunity to have their voices heard. The polarized version of Communist historiography, with a binary good-bad divide between armed movements, was entirely reversed and further restrained an objective study of World War II Yugoslavia. In his Horrors of War, Franjo Tuđman dramatically reduces the number Serbian victims of the Jasenovac concentration camp.[14] He suggests a new view of the Ustaša regime, which he would repeat in numerous speeches as he rose to political prominence in Croatia. Tuđman goes as far to note that the Ustaša regime was “not just a quisling creation, but a manifestation of the eternal Croatian desire for an independent state.” Directly opposite of “domestic fascists”, Tuđman and his followers portrayed the Ustaše as courageous warriors who established and defended Croatian independence against a Serb-dominated Communist threat.

In Serbia, the Četniks were rehabilitated as champions of democracy by nationalist authors who no longer feared incarceration for voicing their views. Vuk Drašković’s Night of the General elevates Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović, the most popular Četnik leader, to the status of a martyr. Describing Mihailović’s trial and execution, Drašković portrays him as an anti-fascist and anti-communist who, despite being betrayed by domestic and foreign allies, stayed with the Serbian people until his very end.[15] The Kragujevac-based publishing house Pogledi continues to publish volumes vindicating the Četnik movement from Partizan accusations. Memoari Jedne Ravnogorke, one of Pogledi’s publications, traces the journey of a female Četnik, Milka Bakić Radosavljević, through war-torn Serbia and works to discredit Partizan accusations of Četnik chauvinism.[16] Pogledi’s autobiographies of Mustafa Mulalić, a Muslim loyal to the Četniks, and Uroš and Igor Šušterić, two Slovene brothers fighting for the Četniks, challenge the assumption that the Četniks strove to create a Greater Serbia where non-Serbs would be persecuted or marginalized.[17] Such sources are beneficial as they reveal information about the Četnik movement that the Communist regime actively sought to conceal.

The Pogledi volumes explore another historical resource useful to the study of the Četniks that has gone untapped for a long time. Documents written by American and English airmen, shot down over Serbia while returning from their bombardment of the Ploesti oil fields, and by American and English missions to the Partizans and Četniks, are used abundantly by Pogledi’s authors. Milorad D. Pešić’s edited volume, Draža Mihailović u Izveštajima Engleskih i Američkih Obaveštajaca, includes over 300 pages of excerpts from Allied reports.[18] The reports reveal new information, however, Pešić only includes excerpts where the Četnik movement is glorified. A typical example is an excerpt in which American Major Richard L. Feldman, himself a Jew, denies Mihailovic’s anti-Semitism and describes Mihailović as a courageous “mountain eagle.”[19] Pešić also excludes sections that shed light on how the Allied informers viewed Četnik atrocities.

Historians of World War II Yugoslavia cannot afford to ignore the reports of Allied operatives in Yugoslavia. Thus far, the only published volume available in the English language is Albert D. Seitz’s memoirs, Mihailovic: Hoax or Hero. Depicting a sympathetic Mihailović, Seitz implies that the British agents on Seitz’s mission distorted the truth about the Četniks and attempted to keep him in the dark by prohibiting Seitz from directly communicating with Mihailović in French.[20] While the excerpts available in Serbian volumes will do little to provide a complete view of World War II in Yugoslavia, historians of Yugoslavia reexamine the sources provided by authors like Pešić for new information of the Partizan- Četnik conflict.

The nationalist historiography of the eighties and nineties, both Serb and Croat, had some positive contributions. Tuđman’s work, exploring the absence of alternatives for young Croats, provides valuable insight on why many Croats ended up in the ranks of the Ustaše. The volumes of Pogledi explore sources that provide new information about the Četnik movement. However, neither of the approaches is analytical and neither seeks to find the complete truth. Rather, they merely provide a reversed perspective in the same polarized binary approach used by the Titoist regime. The movement they represent is entirely positive, while the opposition is portrayed as completely negative. While the impact of nationalist intellectuals on the escalating national tensions in Yugoslavia during the nineties was acknowledged by numerous scholars and journalists, few authors have explored how nationalist writing continues to influence an accurate study of World War II in Yugoslavia. Even though the views Serbian and Croatian authors must be approached with caution, historians should re-visit the sources utilized by them as they may have potential for new insight into the conflict if considered in their completeness.

Reasons for joining armed movements

One problem of Stavrianos’ typology of resistance movements is its reliance on the economic basis of the movements’ composition. If his typology were valid, then the Partizans would have been composed primarily of have-nots and a few disillusioned children from wealthier families, while the Četniks would have been comprised exclusively of wealthy people. One could defend Stavrianos’ view if one assumes that the Partizans defended the economic rights of the have-nots while the Četniks represented those who were previously in power. However, if once considers the composition of the movements’ ranks, one finds that all the movements within Yugoslavia consisted of virtually the same economic group. As Misha Glenny explains in his The Balkans, the peasant-farmer class made up three-quarters of the population. “The countryside had contributed the majority of the recruits to the Partizans, Ustashe and Četniks alike.”[21]

Glenny implies that economics was not what lured people into particular movements. Another common argument about World War II armed movements pertains to political ideology. Thus, historians will note that people who were loyal to the Serbian monarchy signed up for the Četniks, while those seeking social revolution joined the Partizans. Citing Đilas, West notes that many Serbs were lured to the Četnik movement because most of them were “deeply religious, patriotic and in their good natured way devoted to king and country.”[22] Arguing that Serbian peasants, as well as peasants of other ethnicities, joined up with armed movements on the basis of their political affiliations assumes the peasants had political ideals they were willing to die for. The Serbian peasant may have been loyal to king and country, yet to what extent that drove him to the Četniks is debatable. Milazzo argues that the majority of the population perceived the war in local and ethno-religious terms, rather than politically and economically.[23] Scholars who assume that movements like the Partisans and Četniks had established ideologies from the beginning and that the peasants who joined them did so because of their support for the given ideology are most probably wrong.

In his Tito, Mihailović and the Allies, Walter R. Roberts argues that the Četniks were not driven by a single ideology.[24] An analysis of the term Četnik sheds some light on the nature of the movement that was eventually called Četnik. Četniks were armed Serbian groups that waged a form of guerilla warfare on the Turks during the 19th century.[25] While they became somewhat institutionalized during the Balkan wars, developing a hierarchy of vojvodas, or dukes, the term carried a connotation of an insurgent rather than a soldier defending a certain ideology. Thus, rather than espousing a Četnik ideology in the early days of the occupation in 1941, Mihailović declared that he would continue fighting in a “Četnik way.”[26] Mihailović was even opposed to the leader of the officially institutionalized Četniks, Kosta Pećanac, who declared a pro-Axis course once the USSR was attacked. The initial name of Mihailović’s following was the Ravnogorski Pokret, or Ravna Gora movement, not the Četnik Movement.[27]

While the reasons people joined resistance cannot be ascertained with complete accuracy, it was most probably out of a desire to oppose the invaders and protect their lives and property. The inaccuracy of categorizing people according to ideology is evident in Đilas’ Wartime. Đilas encounters the problem of categorizing groups of armed people in Bosnia where several Serbian insurgent groups preferred to call themselves volunteers, rather than Četniks or Partizans.[28] Thus, the people that joined the movement that would eventually be called the Četniks most probably lacked a specific ideology and stood up for alternative reasons.

When people who were members of what eventually became known as the Partizan movement began to conceive of themselves as soldiers following a communist ideology is also debatable. Given the promise of free elections made at the congress in Bihać, one could argue that the Partizans managed to deceive much of their following into believing that they could choose between Tito and the King once the war was over. A lack of political ideology among the Serbian peasantry is demonstrated by the common belief that Tito was Serbian King Aleksandar’s brother. This shows that many may have had no idea about the Tito or his political ideology.[29] Given that the Partizans gained immense popularity as an alternative to the numerous Četnik groups throughout Serbia, one can assume that neither the leaders nor the followers were as focused on political ideology as they were on resistance activities. The case of Father Vlada Zečević, who went over from the Četniks to the Partizans, further supports the claim that the Partizans may not have clearly identified themselves as communists to those they were seeking to recruit.[30]

As Milazzo points out, it appears that local circumstances played a much greater role than political and economic factors in determining how people responded to the Axis invasion. The main motivation of those who joined armed movements was thus to salvage their own lives and lives of people belonging to their ethnic group. For the groups that we call Četniks today, appeasement to the enemy may have appeared to be the best strategy, while for the Partizans, according to all Titoist sources, the only path was through resistance.[31]

An example supporting the belief in the importance of local circumstances can be drawn from a group whose role in World War II has been almost entirely ignored, the Bosnian Muslims. While most volumes mention the involvement of Bosnians in Ustaše and Croatian Domobran units, the formation of a Muslim SS Handžar division and the suffering many Muslim villages experienced at the hands of Bosnian Četniks, the overall wartime experience of the Bosnian Muslims is largely neglected. The example of Husko Miljiković, the leader of an army that bore his own name in Cazinska Krajina, is virtually unknown in history volumes and probably would have been completely forgotten if were it not for the striking resemblance his movement had with that of Fikret Abdić – Babo during the wars of the early nineties. Husko is briefly mentioned in Tomasevich’s volume, where Tomasevich notes that Husko switched the allegiances of his movement between the Ustaše and Partizans on a regular basis.[32] Nevertheless, the tendency of Husko to switch sides indicates that during World War II armed groups would seek “arrangements with whatever force they thought could best safeguard their lives and property and ensure their survival as a group.”[33] Social, economic and political motivations, if present, were only secondary to survival.

Contested issues

Quite a wide array of literature has been written concerning the crimes of the Croatian Ustaše. Books like Barry M. Lituchy’s edited Jasenovac and the Holocaust in Yugoslavia[34] or Vladimir Dedijer’s The Yugoslav Auschwitz[35] use the brutal reign of the Ustaše to reach a variety of conclusions about the Jasenovac concentration camp. Such excessive focus on Jasenovac has led authors to not only neglect village raids that the Ustaše carried out in Serb-dominated areas of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), but also to ignore the Ustaše from a political, ideological and military perspective. While Croatian neo-fascists today will boast about NDH’s military supremacy and their defense of Croatian independence, Tomasevich’s section on the Ustaše shows that neither of these two claims is true. Politically, Ante Pavelić and his leadership had to fend off Italy, an ally who strove to gain much of Croatia’s coast. Throughout Milazzo’s volume, one can see how the Ustaše failed at administering not only their coast, but also a good deal of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Lika, Northern Dalmatia and Kordun, where the Italians also tried to expand their influence at Zagreb’s expense.[36] In the region of Nevesinje, the Italians made a compromise with the Serbian insurgents and restored Serbian rights in much of the region without Zagreb’s consent.[37]

Thus, the idea that with the NDH the Croats had political control over their own land is very much an illusion. That a good section of the NDH was run by Serb-armed bands, backed by Italy, was a further political humiliation to the Ustaša regime that failed to keep the Italians at bay. Another illusion, argues Tomasevich, is the belief that the Ustaše were the ideological heirs of previous agitators for Croatian independence, like Ante Starčević, Josip Frank and Stjepan Radić, whose visions Tomasevich argues the Ustaše distorted.[38] While Radić, Frank and Starčevic never envisioned a Croatia as dependent on any external state, other Ustaša policies were reflected in Starčevic’s writing. Starčević has, in numerous articles and speeches, called for the extermination and acculturation of the Serbs, which is not too far from the Ustaša policy of exterminating a third, baptizing another third and expelling the last third as voiced by Mile Budak in April of 1941.

Militarily, argues Tomasevich, the NDH was weak and relied heavily on Axis support. The military prowess of a few elite troops that were recruited to fight in Russia alongside the Wermacht was not matched by the majority of the Ustaše forces or the regular Domobrani. While they were successful in annihilating defenseless villages, their divisions would crumble when they were attacked by Italian-armed Četniks or better-organized Partizans. Upon the withdrawal of Italy from the war, Hitler, who was initially opposed to the Italians’ collaboration with the Četniks in Bosanska Krajina, was even forced to turn to Četnik Vovjoda Momčilo Đuić for help because the Ustaše were unable to successfully carry out his ordered attacks against the Partizans.[39] While Croatian nationalists today may revere the NDH as a state that upheld Croatian independence politically and militarily, it would be fair to say that the NDH’s political weakness, military disorganization and brutal campaign of terror prevented the NDH from accomplishing any of the tasks for which the nationalists credit them.

While there can be little debate concerning the extent to which the NDH was collaborationist, the nature of the Četniks and Partizans is a more widely disputed topic. Milazzo’s concluding argument that the Četniks were collaborationist in practice, but anti-Axis in their long-range intent, is well supported throughout the book.[40] Tomasevich agrees with this point, arguing that all Četnik plans were to culminate in an Allied victory.[41] Using Četnik radio messages intercepted by the Italians, Tomasevich shows that the Četniks vowed to turn the weapons the Italians had given them on the Italians once the time was ripe.[42]

However, to what extent the Četnik policy of accommodation to the Axis, as Roberts calls it, amounts to collaboration is disputable. In areas of the NDH, deals with the Italians were the only way to protect the Serbian population. In Serbia, avoiding massacres like the one in Kragujevac where thousands of civilians were executed in response to the murder of a few Germans was a key influence of Četnik restraint. The determination to protect Serbian lives may vindicate the Četniks from the accusation of collaboration. Yet, everywhere the Četniks “put off anti-Axis resistance, tried to secure their own regional ‘spheres’ within the occupation system, and concentrated their efforts against domestic opponents.”[43] Thus, they found themselves working directly with indisputable collaborators, such as Milan Nedić’s National Guard and Dimitrije Ljotić’s fascist following, and indirectly with Germans and Italians in order to secure their ground against the Partizans. However, the fact that the Četniks had compromised themselves as collaborators does not exonerate the Partizans, as their movement was not nearly as clean-cut as forty-five years of Titoist propaganda attempted to portray.

Few can deny Roberts’ claim that Tito’s movement was militarily more active and politically more astute than any of the competitors during the war.[44] The Partizans also deserve recognition for the inclusion of all ethnic groups into their movement, which distinguished them from the mostly ethnically intolerant movements that committed atrocities against outsiders throughout the rest of the country. Yet, there are numerous grounds on which the Partizans compromised themselves.

While Đilas notes that the Partizans opposed an Axis invasion from the beginning and were among the first to join the resistance, there is little evidence to substantiate such claims.[45] As Stavrianos notes, the extent of Tito’s activity prior to the invasion of Russia remains disputable today.[46] Roberts implies that the Partizans most probably observed the early days of the invasion and refused to act, assuming that the war was a struggle between fascist and imperialist forces.[47] He also remarks that communist activity became clearly evident with the invasion of Russia as Tito struck immediately to alleviate the pressure put on the Russian front.[48]

While some of the charges made by Serbian nationalists, such as claiming Tito’s movement was collaborationist, are clearly far-fetched, others are not to be ignored. Milazzo acknowledges that both the Germans and the Partizans were aware that an allied invasion would work towards the Četniks’ advantage.[49] Thus, Tito’s offer of a temporary armistice to the Germans in 1943 sought a cease-fire that would allow both sides to deal with the Četniks before resuming operations against each other.[50] While Tito’s arrangements with the Germans were never as extensive or long lasting as Mihailović’s, their nature was not much different.

While Đilas adheres to the traditional narrative, claiming that the Partizans were ready to work with anyone who wanted to attack the Axis and did not concern themselves with the future form of government, such an argument is barely credible.[51] As Glenny notes, resistance was only one part of the program, while revolution made up the second part of the Partizan leaders’ agenda.[52] The claim that the Partizans used humane measures, even against enemies, can also be disproven. Even Đilas notes that Partizan soldiers were sometimes coerced to kill their relatives, who were often left without a proper burial.[53] Roberts argues that a number of coercive measures were used to mobilize certain villages. Although Đilas does not acknowledge that Partizans engaged in Ustaša-like atrocities, he does admit that Ustaša excesses sometimes worked towards the Partizans’ advantage. In Bosnia, some Partizans remarked that Ustaša activities were helpful as they killed off the Serbian bourgeoisie, priests, merchants and members of political parties, leaving the terrain open for mobilization.[54]


The typology developed by Stavrianos is helpful in understanding a pattern that was generally followed by resistance movements in the Balkans. Yet, when one explores the specific character of the Yugoslav conflict, numerous exceptions to Stavrianos’ typology can be found. The lines between the armed groups were not always as clear-cut as many historical volumes make them appear. Assuming that the primary motivator for people was always survival; political, ideological and economic factors should be considered as secondary in importance. The binary system of analyzing World War II that was developed by the Titoist government and then inverted by Serbian and Croatian nationalists continues to paralyze attempts at an objective study of World War II in Yugoslavia. Only with an approach that will allow positive and negative aspects of each armed faction to be considered simultaneously will a more accurate account of Yugoslavia during World War II be possible.


Bakic-Radosavljevic, Milka. Memoari Jedne Ravnogorke. Kragujevac, Serbia & Montenegro: Pogledi, 2001.

Dedijer, Vladimir. The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992.

Delic, Stipe. The Battle of Sutjeska. Bosnafilm, 1973.

Djilas, Milovan. Wartime. Translated by Michael Boro Petrovich. New York, NY: Harecourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.

Draskovic, Vuk. Noc Generala. 3rd ed. Belgrade: Srpska Rec – BIGZ, 1994.

Glenny, Misha. The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Power, 1804-1999. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1999.

Lituchy, Barry M., ed. Jasenovac and the Holocaust in Yugoslavia. New York, NY: Jasenovac Research Institute, 2006.

Milazzo, Matteo. The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.

Pesic, D. Milorad, ed. Draza Mihailovic u Izvestajima Americkih Obavestajaca. Kragujevac: Pogledi, 2003.

Roberts, Walter R. Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987.

Seitz, Albert B. Mihailovic: Hoax Or Hero? Columbus, OH: Leigh House Publishers, 1953.

Stavrianos, L. S. The Balkans since 1453. New York, NY: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1958.

Susteric, Uros. Od Ljubljane do Ravne Gore. Kragujevac, Serbia & Montenegro: Pogledi, 2004.

Tomasevich, Jozo. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Tudjman, Franjo. Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy. Translated by Katarina Mijatovic. New York, NY: M. Evans and Inc, 1997.

West, Richard. Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia. New York, NY: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 1994.

[1] L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, (New York, NY: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1958), 763.

[2] Ibid., 763.

[3] Ibid., 763.

[4] Ibid., 779.

[5] Ibid., 763.

[6] Richard West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, (New York, NY: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 1994), 200.

[7] Ibid., 200.

[8] Milovan Djilas, Wartime, trans. Michael Boro Petrovich. (New York, NY: Harecourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 5.

[9] Ibid., 99.

[10] Ibid., 97.

[11] Stipe Delic, The Battle of Sutjeska,Anonymous Bosnafilm, 1973)

[12] Matteo Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 29.

[13] Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: Occupation and Collaboration, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 719.

[14] Franjo Tudjman, Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy, trans. Katarina Mijatovic. (New York, NY: M. Evans and Inc, 1997), 15.

[15] Vuk Draskovic, Noc Generala, 3rd ed. (Belgrade: Srpska Rec – BIGZ, 1994)

[16] Milka Bakic-Radosavljevic, Memoari Jedne Ravnogorke, (Kragujevac, Serbia & Montenegro: Pogledi, 2001)

[17] Uros Susteric, Od Ljubljane Do Ravne Gore, (Kragujevac, Serbia & Montenegro: Pogledi, 2004)

[18] D. Milorad Pesic ed., Draza Mihailovic u Izvestajima Americkih Obavestajaca,Anonymous (Kragujevac: Pogledi, 2003)

[19] Ibid., 27.

[20] Albert B. Seitz, Mihailovic: Hoax or Hero? (Columbus, OH: Leigh House Publishers, 1953), 14.

[21] Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Power, 1804-1999, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1999), 545.

[22] West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, 209.

[23] Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance, 186.

[24] Walter R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 20.

[25] Ibid., 22.

[26] Ibid., 22.

[27] Ibid., 22.

[28] Djilas, Wartime, 141.

[29] Ibid., 132.

[30] Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: Occupation and Collaboration, 514.

[31] Djilas, Wartime, 88.

[32] Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: Occupation and Collaboration, 502.

[33] Ibid., 494.

[34] Vladimir Dedijer, The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican, (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992)

[35] Barry M. Lituchy ed., Jasenovac and the Holocaust in Yugoslavia, Anonymous (New York, NY: Jasenovac Research Institute, 2006)

[36] Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: Occupation and Collaboration, 50.

[37] Ibid., 48.

[38] Ibid., 349.

[39] Ibid., 310.

[40] Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance, 138.

[41] Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: Occupation and Collaboration, 254.

[42] Ibid., 254.

[43] Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance, 62.

[44] Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945, 320.

[45] Djilas, Wartime, 45.

[46] Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 773.

[47] Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945, 23.

[48] Ibid., 23.

[49] Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance, 132.

[50] Ibid., 134.

[51] Djilas, Wartime, 45.

[52] Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Power, 1804-1999, 490.

[53] Djilas, Wartime, 149.

[54] Ibid., 205.




2 responses

2 09 2009
Tihomir Erdeljac

Ko je taj Stavrianos’ ?

2 05 2011
Deye_seq 2 | tdeye2010

[…] “World War II in Yugoslavia: A Historiographical Review.” Balkan Savage, n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2011. […]

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